



in the United States
Introduction
In November 1977, Forbes described the pace of foreign investment in
American manufacturing as a "discreet amble."I By April 1979, Forbes re-
ported that the pace of such foreign investment now resembled "the fury of
an Olympic 100-meter dash." 2I According to one study, during the first quar-
ter of 1979 there were sixty-three acquisitions of American companies by
aliens as compared to thirty-seven similar acquisitions during the first quarter
of 1978.1 Another study indicated that in 1978 foreign direct investment in
the United States increased fifty percent over 1977 in number of completed
transactions and seventy percent in reported values.'
The reasons for this much publicized "dash" by foreigners to invest in the
United States include: the decline in the value of the dollar; the relative politi-
cal and economic stability of the American market; the fact that American
labor and tax costs are now competitive with those of most industrialized
countries; and the attractiveness of the large size of many American
markets.5
There have been several reactions to this increasing tide of foreign invest-
ment, including Congressionally mandated studies" and legislation by both
*Mr. Griffin practices law in Washington, D.C.
'Foreign Investment in the U.S.-It Grows ... But Slowly, FORBES, Nov. 15, 1977, at 158.
2Foreign Investors in the U.S.-The Pace Quickens, FoRaEs, Apr. 2, 1979, at 73.
'Merger Notices Rose 14% in First Period, W. T. Grimm Says, Wall St. J., Apr. 11, 1979, at
15, col. I
'U.S. Dept. of Commerce Press Release No. ITA 79-107 (June 13, 1979)
'See, e.g., D. LAMONT, FOREIGN STATE ENTERI'RISES: A THREAT TO AMERICAN BUSINESS 151-63
(1979); K. CROWE, AMERICA FOR SALE (1978); Mergers and Acquisitions which contains quar-
terly reports on "Foreign Investment in the U.S."; Corporate Takeovers Are Here to Stay,
FORTUNE, May 8, 1978, at 91; A Continuing Wave of British Takeovers, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 19,
1977, at 27; WEAK DOLLAR, STOCKS SPUR FOREIGNERS TO SEEK ACQUISITIONS IN THE U.S., Wall
St. J., Aug. 21, 1979 at 1, col. 6.
'See, e.g., Foreign Investment Study Act, Pub. L. No. 93-479, 88 Stat. 1450 (1974). Pursuant
to this legislation the Department of Commerce produced in 1976, a nine volume study. See,
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the federal' and state governments.' In this issue Mr. Hendrickson's article
has treated The Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of 1978. This
article will now examine the constraints imposed by United States antitrust
laws on acquisitions by aliens in the United States; first by reviewing applica-
ble legal standards; second by reviewing the various modes of enforcement of
the relevant federal antitrust laws, and finally by summarizing three leading
relevant cases.
1. Legal Standards
United States antitrust laws seek to prevent conduct that weakens or de-
stroys competition. For that reason they also seek to prevent giant aggrega-
tions of economic power from being built unfairly since the use of such power
stifles the opportunities for competition and may result in undemocratic con-
centrations of political power.
Only unreasonable restraints of competition are illegal under the antitrust
laws, but some restraints have come to be classified as per se unreasonable.
Once such a restraint is proven to exist, no further inquiry will be made into
the reasonableness or economic justification of the restraint. Justice Black
explained the reasons for theperse exception to the general "rule of reason"
standard in the following often-quoted statement:
However, there are certain agreements or practices which because of their perni-
cious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively pre-
sumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the
precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use. This principle of
perse unreasonableness not only makes the type of restraints which are proscribed
by the Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also
avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investi-
gation into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries,
in an effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been unreason-
able-an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken. 9
Practices which have been classified as unreasonable per se include: price
fixing,' 0 division of markets,"I group boycotts,' 2 and tying arrangements.
U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES. (1976).
'See, e.g., Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of 1978, 92 Stat 1266 (effective
Oct. 14, 1978).
'See generally DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BAR, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: LE-
GAL ISSUES AND TECHNIQUES (2d ed. 1980).
'Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); see National Soc'y of
Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-92 (1978); Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price
Fixing and Market Division, (pt. 1), 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965), (pt.) 2, 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966).
"See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
"See, e.g., United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modified,
175 U.S. 211 (1899).
"See, e.g., Fashion Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
'See, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
Antitrust Constraints on Acquisitions by Aliens
A. Statutes
Several different federal antitrust statutes apply to acquisitions by aliens in
the United States." However, under each of these statutes, the test is one of
reasonableness in the circumstances and not per se unreasonableness.
Acquisitions are most likely to be challenged under Section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act which prohibits the direct or indirect acquisition by one corporation
of all or any part of the stock or assets of another corporation "where in any
line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition
may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monop-
oly.' ' I It is not necessary for the Government or a private plaintiff to prove
that an acquisition substantially lessens competition or creates a monopoly.
It is sufficient to establish that there is a reasonable probability that the
acquisition will produce one of those effects in the future.' 6
Under Section 7 both the acquiring and acquired entities must be "cor-
porations" which are "engaged in commerce." 7 Although the Clayton Act
does not define the word "corporation," it probably applies to foreign enti-
ties that have the principal attributes of corporations such as limited liability
and continuity of existence." However, if one of the parties to the transac-
tion is either an individual or a partnership Section 7 would not apply.' 9
To be "engaged in commerce" the corporations must be "directly engaged
in the production, distribution, or acquisition of goods or services" in com-
merce among the states of the United States or between the United States and
a foreign country.2" Moreover, Section 7 requires that the potential anticom-
petitive effects of the acquisition be "in any section of the [United States]." 2 '
Thus, if the only anticompetitive effects of the acquisition are outside the
United States, Section 7 does not apply.
Section 7 expressly provides that it does not apply to acquisitions of stock
solely for investment if such stock is not used "by voting or otherwise to bring
about, or in attempting to bring about, the substantial lessening of competi-
tion." 22
"For summaries of state antitrust statutes, see 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 30,000; ABA
ANTITRUST SECTION, STATE ANTITRUST LAWS (1974).
"Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
"See, e.g., United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549(1971); Brown Shoe Co.
v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
"15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
"2 B. Fox & E. Fox, CORPORATE AcQUISITIONS AND MERGERS, § 33.03[4] (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Fox & Fox].
"The Justice Department supports legislation to extend Section 7 to acquisitions involving all
types of business entities. Hearings on S. 390 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. (Feb. 19, 1979) (testimony of
Assistant Attorney General John H. Shenefield).
"United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 283 (1975). See gener-
ally 1 Fox & Fox, supra note 18, at § 7.0412] [b].
"15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
2215 U.S.C. § 18 (1976); see, e.g., Gulf& Western Indus., Inc. v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co.,
476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973).
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Acquisitions may also be prohibited by Sections 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act
as unreasonable restraints of trade or as illegal attempts to monopolize a
particular market23 and by Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
(FTC Act) as unfair methods of competition. 21 In addition, if any directors of
the acquiring corporation serve as directors of companies that compete with
the acquired corporation, the acquisition may result in a violation of the
interlocking directorship provisions of Section 8 of the Clayton Act. 2'
The jurisdictional reach of the Sherman and FTC Acts is considerably
broader than that of the Clayton Act. Unlike the Clayton Act, which is lim-
ited to corporations engaged in United States commerce, 26 the Sherman and
FTC Acts have been held to apply to all activities that Congress has the power
to regulate under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution."
Such activities include "every species of commercial intercourse between the
United States and foreign nations."" Thus, the Sherman and FTC Acts have
been deemed to apply to activities that "affect" United States commerce as
well as to activities that are "in" United States commerce. Consequently,
those statutes apply to communication or transportation between the United
States and foreign countries as well as to United States exports and imports.
29
Nevertheless, because the Sherman Act requires proof of an actual re-
straint, as opposed to the Clayton Act's requirement of proof of a potential
lessening of competition, the Sherman Act has not been deemed to be an
effective weapon against anticompetitive acquisitions. Moreover, although
Section 5 of the FTC Act has a broader jurisdictional reach than the Clayton
Act, it cannot be enforced by private parties or by the Justice Department.
The FTC could take action against acquisitions involving foreign entities in
situations where the Clayton Act would not apply, but it has rarely done so.
When the FTC does bring a merger case it usually alleges a violation of both
the Clayton and FTC Acts.
The jurisdictional reach of these statutes should not be confused with a
court's jurisdiction over a particular entity that may be a defendant in a
particular case. The former aspect of jurisdiction is known as "legislative"
jurisdiction and the latter aspect is known as "personal" jurisdiction.
2315 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976); see, e.g., Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131
(1969).
2415 U.S.C. § 45 (1976); see, e.g., Golden Grain Macaroni Co. v. FTC, 472 F.2d 882 (9th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918 (1973).
215 U.S.C. § 19 (1976).
2"The Justice Department supports legislation to reverse United States v. American Building
Maintenance Ind., 422 U.S. 271 (1975), by making Section 7 applicable to acquisitions involving
entities whose activities affect United States interstate or foreign commerce. Testimony of John
H. Shenefield, supra note 19.
27U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743
(1976).
"Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 193 (1824).
"9See, e.g., Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969). See W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTI-
TRUST LAWS, ch. 2 (2d ed. 1973); Kintner & Griffin, Jurisdiction over Foreign Commerce under
the Sherman Antitrust Act, 18 B. C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 199 (1977).
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Personal jurisdiction is limited by the Due Process clause of the United
States Constitution. American courts are permitted to assert jurisdiction over
non-American defendants only when those defendants have minimum con-
tacts with the forum of such a nature and quality that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend "traditional [American] notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice." '30 This fairness test requires a court to weigh the competing
interests of the parties: the defendant's interest in not being compelled to
defend a suit in a foreign court; the plaintiff's interest in vindicating his claim
in the court of his choice; and the public's interest in the issue.3' Justice
Frankfurter, noting that the crucial issues are questions of fact turning upon
the unique circumstances of each case, stated that "a corporation can be
'found' anywhere, whenever the needs of the law make it appropriate to
attribute location to a corporation, only if activities on its behalf that are
more than episodic are carried on by its agents in a particular place. '" 2
Often in cases involving non-American corporations personal jurisdica-
tion is obtained by "lifting the veil" of separate incorporation between the
foreign parent and its American subsidiary corporation. The official position
of the United States Government is that:
When a subsidiary acts on behalf of a foreign parent, and there is such an identity of
interest between the two or such control by one over the other that the one is in
reality the alter ego of the other, or its mere agent, instrumentality, or adjunct, then
the parent comes within the U.S. jurisdiction.33
The following facts are usually deemed relevant to the conclusion that veil-
lifting is appropriate in order to establish "presence": the amount of owner-
ship by the parent of the subsidiary; the existence of common officers or
directors; the intermingling of the affairs of the two entities instead of the
meticulous maintenance of separate accounts, tax returns, and so forth; the
undercapitalization of the subsidiary; a representation by either entity that
blurs the separation of the two units; bad faith, fraud, or illegality; and the
degree of supervision of the day-to-day affairs of the subsidiary by the
"Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 249-50, (1958); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355
U.S. 220, 223 (1957); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) quoting
from Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,463 (1940); see Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court
Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 241; Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause
and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569 (1958); Note, Quasi in
Rem Jurisdiction Over Foreigners, 12 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 67 (1979).
"In addition to satisfying the constitutional requirement of fairness, the court must assert its
personal jurisdiction and notify the defendant corporations of the suit by valid service of process
pursuant to relevant statutes and court rules. Service must be made in a manner reasonably
calculated to notify the defendant of the proceeding and to afford it a reasonable opportunity to
appear and be heard. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
"United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795, 819 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.
concurring).
"6 M. WHrrEMAN, DIGEST OF INTEmATIONAL LAW § 6 at 118-19 (1968). The U.S. Supreme
Court has held that a stipulation by a subsidiary that it is the same entity as its parent is insuffi-
cient to give a court personal jurisdiction over the alien parent in the absence of service on the
parent and an appearance by the parent. Zenith Corp. v. Hazeltine, 395 U.S. 100 (1969).
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parent. No single factor is decisive and factors are often cumulated to sup-
port the decision."' Essentially, the test is a determination of whether the two
separate legal entities in fact function as a single business entity.
B. Standards for Acquisitions Involving Aliens
Some foreign businessmen have charged that the United States antitrust
laws have been used discriminatorily against acquisitions of United States
firms by aliens.3" However, American antitrust enforcement officials have
consistently taken the position that they do not "discriminate against or in
favor of business entities on the basis of their citizenship in any antitrust
situation. In U.S. antitrust enforcement, it is a firm's role in or effect on U.S.
commerce that is of concern." 3'
In fact, the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Justice
Department's Antitrust Division has stated that "foreign purchasers of U.S.
business are likely as not to be procompetitive, to be invigorating, to be
avenues by which new technologies come into this country, and new sources
of capital introduced." 3
The United States courts have also rejected contentions that they should
enjoin or prohibit acquisitions by aliens merely because the acquirers are
foreign. The courts have taken the position that in the absence of Congres-
sional guidance to the contrary, foreign investment will be tested under the
same standards as domestic investment. 8
However, the Justice Department's Antitrust Guide for International
Operations contains the following statement which appears to indicate an
increasing flexibility when dealing with international transactions:
The rule of reason may have a somewhat broader application to international
transactions where it is found that (1) experience with adverse effects on competi-
tion is much more limited than in the domestic market, or (2) there are some special
justifications not normally found in the domestic market. Either circumstance
could justify a fuller factual inquiry. We emphasize, however, that the normal per
se rules will be applied fully to basic horizontal restraints designed to affect United
States market prices or conditions or to divide the United States market from other
markets."
"See generally Note, Personal Jurisdiction Over A lien Corporate Parents and Affiliates in
Antitrust Actions: A Pleafor Perspicuity, 5 SYR. J. INT'L L. &CoM. 149(1977); W. CARY, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 109-49 (4th ed. 1970); I W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 25 (M. Wolf, perm. ed. 1974).
"See, e.g., "Unwelcome Mat?" Invest-in-U.S. Craze Loses Some Allurefor Foreign Firms,
Wall St. J., June 14, 1974, at 1, col. 6.
"ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERA-
TIONS 18 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ANTITRUST GUIDE], reprinted in 799 ANTITRUST & TRADE
REO. REP (BNA) at E-I (Feb. 1, 1977). The International Guide was published in January 1977
and slightly revised in March 1977. It may be purchased from the United States Government
Printing Office (stock No. 027-000-00495-4).
"875 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) at AA-7 (Aug. 3, 1978).
"See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal, 403 F. Supp. 579, 608 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (See text at
note 97 infra for a description of this case); Texasgulf Inc. v. Canadian Dev. Corp., 366 F. Supp.
374, 419 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
"ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 36, at 2-3. In a 1977 speech, Attorney General Griffin B. Bell
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An example of the type of contention that may be raised under such an
"international rule of reason" analysis is the following contention made by
the British Government in its A micus Curiae Brief to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the BOC case,' ° which involved an FTC
challenge to the acquisition of an American firm by a British company:
All firms, whether domestic or foreign, face a series of obstacles to entering a new
market. However, a foreign firm seeking to enter a market in another country faces
numerous additional commercial, cultural, and legal barriers which do not con-
front firms expanding inside a single nation.
Although, generally, these barriers are not individually insurmountable, their
cumulative effect is to increase the difficulty of entry by a foreign firm. In some
situations these barriers may make de novo entry or significant expansion of a small
toehold acquisition impossible or impractical. In all events, the [FTC] must con-
sider the effect of the barriers to foreign entry in particular cases. Failure to under-
take such an analysis is, the British Government submits, reversible error.
The British Government does not contend that the legal standards are, or should
be, different for acquisitions by foreign companies. However, it is submitted that
the factors relevant to a proper analysis of whether Section 7 of the Clayton Act has
been violated vary as between acquisitions by domestic firms and those by foreign
firms for the reasons mentioned above. This contention may be analogized to the
legal analysis necessary in tort cases to determine whether the "reasonable man"
standard of conduct has been met. The legal standard is the same in each case, i.e.,
whether the actor's conduct was that of a reasonable man. However, the factors
which must be considered in order to answer properly this legal question vary with
the particular circumstances of each case."
In a speech discussing the British Government's amicus brief, Douglas
Rosenthal, the Chief of the Foreign Commerce Section of the Antitrust Divi-
sion, noted that "foreign firms may be entitled to special considerations
when acquiring U.S. enterprises depending upon the nature and extent of the
barriers to their entry. But these barriers need not necessarily be great ones
and, if not, the foreign firms may be more vulnerable to antitrust chal-
lenge."'
As an example of a situation in which a foreign firm's exposure might be
greater than an American firm's, Mr. Rosenthal pointed to the Justice
Department's complaint against Alcan Aluminium Limited of Canada and
its American subsidiary.' 3 The subsidiary had agreed to acquire an aluminum
smelter and rolling mill in Alabama owned by Revere Copper & Brass, Incor-
porated. The Justice Department sought to enjoin the acquisition because it
would have eliminated competition between Alcan and Revere in the supply
noted that a "current major concern is that the realities of foreign competition should be consid-
ered in the enforcement of the antitrust laws." Address by Griffin B. Bell, The University Club
10 (Dec. 14, 1977).
"'BOC int'l Ltd. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977)
"Brief for Amicus Curiae at 19-20 (June 30, 1976). See text at note 98, infra, for a description
of the BOC case.
"Rosenthal, InternationalAntitrust Aspects of Mergers, 1978 N.Y. STATE BAR Assoc. ANTI-
TRUST LAW SYMPOSIUM 15, 19 (Jan. 18, 1978).
"United States v. Alcan Aluminium Ltd., 4 TRADE Ran. REP. (CCH) 45,077 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
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and sale of primary aluminum and in the production and sale of aluminum
rolling mill products and aluminum sheet. Alcan's American subsidiary
ranked fourth and Revere's facility ranked tenth in shipments of both rolling
mill products and aluminum sheet. According to Mr. Rosenthal,
One of the considerations that led to the filing of this suit, as stated in the com-
plaint, is the very substantial potential that Alcan has for having an impact in the
United States market through sales of refined Canadian aluminum. Right across
the border in fact, it has greater direct access to many important northeast and
north central United States markets from Canadian sources than do many Ameri-
can producers. Alcan, the government believes, has an approximately 8076 share of
the U.S. primary aluminum market. It further believes that this share could be
significantly increased by the importation of substantial Canadian production into
U.S. markets."
Although no court has ruled on the issue, it seems clear that the difficulties
and advantages of acquisitions by aliens in the United States will become
increasingly important factors under the "international rule of reason."
C. The Relevant Market
The legality of a particular acquisition is determined by reference to the
relevant product market ("line of commerce") and the relevant geographic
market ("section of the country"). The identification of these relevant
markets is often a major point of controversy.
1. RELEVANT PRODUCT MARKET
The following definition of a relevant product market is contained in the
Justice Department's Merger Guidelines:
The sales of any product or service which is distinguishable as a matter of commer-
cial practice from other products or services will ordinarily constitute a relevant
product market, even though, from the standpoint of most purchasers, other prod-
ucts may be reasonably, but not perfectly, interchangeable with it in terms of price,
quality, and use. On the other hand, the sales of two distinct products to a particular
group of purchasers can also appropriately be grouped into a single market where
the two products are reasonably interchangeable for that group in terms of price,
quality, and use. In this latter case, however, it may be necessary also to include in
that market the sales of one or more other products which are equally interchange-
able with the two products in terms of price, quality, and use from the standpoint of
that group of purchasers for whom the two products are interchangeable."
According to the United States Supreme Court the "outer boundaries" of
the relevant product market "are determined by the reasonable interchange-
ability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself and
substitutes for it .. "46 However, within such markets there may be sub-
markets which alone may constitute the relevant product market in a particu-
"Rosenthal, supra note 42.
"1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4510, at 6882-83 (May 30, 1968) [hereinafter cited as MERGER
GUIDELINES].
"'Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
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lar case. The Court mentioned seven factors to consider in identifying sub-
markets:
1. industry or public recognition of the submarket as a separate economic
entity;
2. the product's peculiar characteristics and uses;
3. unique production facilities;
4. distinct customers;
5. distinct prices;
6. sensitivity to price changes; and
7. specialized vendors.47
2. RELEVANT GEOGRAPHIC MARKET
According to the Justice Department's Merger Guidelines
The total sales of a product or service in any commercially significant section of the
country (even as small as a single community), or aggregate of such sections, will
ordinarily constitute a geographic market if firms engaged in selling the product
make significant sales of the product to purchasers in the section or sections. The
market need not be enlarged beyond any section meeting the foregoing test unless it
clearly appears that there is no economic barrier (e.g., significant transportation
costs, lack of distribution facilities, customer inconvenience, or established con-
sumer preference for existing products) that hinders the sale from outside the sec-
tion to purchasers within the section; nor need the market be contracted to exclude
some portion of the product sales made inside any section meeting the foregoing test
unless it clearly appears that the portion of sales in question is made to a group of
purchasers separated by a substantial economic barrier from the purchasers to
whom the rest of the sales are made."
The relevant geographic market is often the entire United States. However,
factors such as advantages of service and convenience, common economic
and competitive factors within the area, and trade recognition of the area as a
separate geographic market have been used to narrow the definition of the
relevant geographic market. 9
D. Classification of Acquisitions
For purposes of analysis, acquisitions are classified as "horizontal," "ver-
tical," or "conglomerate." A "horizontal" acquisition is one where the ac-
quiring and acquired companies are direct competitors in both the same rele-
vant product and geographic markets.5 0 A "vertical" acquisition is one
where the acquired and acquiring companies are in a supplier-customer rela-
tionship. This classification is often subdivided into "backward vertical inte-
gration," that is, the acquisition of a supplier,1 ' and "forward vertical inte-
47Id.
"MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 45, at 6883.
"See, e.g., United States v. Conn. Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974); United States v. General
Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
"°See, e.g., United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974); United States v.
Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
"See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972).
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gration," that is, the acquisition of a customer." "Conglomerate"
acquisitions are those where the two firms are not related from the horizontal
or vertical viewpoint. There are three subcategories of conglomerate acquisi-
tions: a "pure conglomerate" acquisition, in other words, the acquisition of
a totally unrelated firm;" a "market-extension" acquisition, where both
companies manufacture or distribute the same products but do so in different
geographic areas;" and a "product-extension" acquisition, where the prod-
ucts of both companies are functionally related to each other."
E. Possible Anti-Competitive Effects of Acquisitions
1. ELIMINATION OF ACTUAL COMPETITION
If the result of the acquisition is loss of a substantial competitor, especially
in a concentrated market, it will almost always be illegal. 5
2. ELIMINATION OF POTENTIAL COMPETITION
An acquisition may lessen potential competition in two ways. If a large
company in a concentrated market is acquired by a company outside that
market which is perceived by those in the market as a potential entrant, the
competitive pressure created by the potential entrant "waiting in the wings"
of the market is removed. So long as the potential competitor is waiting in the
wings those in the market will keep prices and profit margins lower than they
would if there were no threat of the outsider entering the market. When the
outsider acquires a large firm in the market, it no longer poses a threat, the
"wings" effect on prices disappears, and competition is thereby lessened.
This theory is known as the "perceived potential entrant" theory."
A second theory involving potential competition is the "actual potential
entrant" theory. Though this theory has been advocated by the FTC it has
not been accepted by the United States Supreme Court, which has twice
refused to rule on its validity." According to the FTC's theory, an acquisition
which has no effect on existing competition may violate Section 7 of the
Clayton Act if such an acquisition eliminates the probability of future in-
creased competition in the market, which, but for the acquisition, would
have resulted from a later de novo or toehold entry by the acquiring com-
pany.'
"See, e.g., Miss. River Corp. v. FTC, 454 F.2d 1083 (8th Cir. 1972).
"See, e.g., United States v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 1301 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
"See, e.g., United States v. El Paso Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
"See, e.g., FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965); Kennecott Copper Corp.
v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 909 (1974).
"United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963).
"7See, e.g., United States v. Marine Bancorp., Inc., 418 U.S. 602,625 (1974); United States v.
Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 532-33 (1973).
"See cases cited note 57 supra. See also, FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289(4th Cir.
1977).
"See, e.g., In re British Oxygen Co., 11973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
j 21,063 (1975).
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In the BOC case" where the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit rejected this theory, the court noted that two questions must be
answered before the "actual potential entrant" theory can be applied:
First, would the firm in question enter de novo or by toehold acquisition if not
permitted to enter by acquiring a large company? Second, would the de novo or
toehold entry of the firm have procompetitive effects on the market in ques-
tion....
While it is not clear - and we need not decide - whether the probable entry of the
acquiring firm must be "imminent" in an actual potential entrant situation, it seems
necessary under Section 7 that the finding of probable entry at least contain some
reasonable temporal estimate related to the near future, with "near" defined in
terms of the entry barriers and lead time necessary for entry in the particular in-
dustry, and that the finding be supported by substantial evidence in the record."
3. RECIPROCITY
Acquisitions may create the opportunity for reciprocal dealing, in other
words, "I'll buy from you, if you'll buy from me.'"'6
4. SUBSTITUTION OF A LARGER COMPETITOR (DEEP POCKETS)
When a large firm acquires an already significant company in a highly
concentrated industry, the effect is to entrench the acquired firm or create an
oligopolistic condition. 63 However, a large company may lawfully acquire a
"toehold" size firm64 or a "failing company ' 6' and thereby promote com-
petition.
5. FORECLOSURE
In a vertical acquisition a competitor of the acquired firm may be fore-
closed from part of the market that he relied on to function as a competitor.
For example, A and B may compete as suppliers to or purchasers from C.
However, if C acquires A, B may be foreclosed from selling to or purchasing
from C.66
F. Trends in Analyzing Acquisitions
Generally, horizontal acquisitions involving two significant competitors in
an industry with a trend toward concentration are illegal." In the Phila-
delphia National Bank case 6 the Supreme Court announced the following
test of illegality:
"*BOC Int'l Ltd. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 24 (2nd Cir. 1977).
6'Id. at 29.
"See, e.g., FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
"1FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
"In re Budd Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 20,998 (1975). For various definitions of a
"toehold" acquisition, see BOC Int'l Ltd. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 24, 26 n.3 (1977).
6'International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
"See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
"See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States v. Pabst
Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
"United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
438 INTERNATIONAL LA WYER
[A] merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the
relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the concentration of firms in
that market is so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that it must be
enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to
have such anticompetitive effects.69
Thus, the legality of a horizontal acquisition is usually tested initially in
terms of the amount of competition eliminated. If the combined market
strength of the two companies is greater than five percent of the relevant
market, the acquisition immediately becomes suspicious. As this combined
market percentage increases, the risk of illegality becomes greater. Other
significant factors include the acquisition history of the acquiring company,
the trend toward oligopolistic concentration in the industry, the ease of entry
into the industry, and the cumulative effects of prior acquisitions by the
acquiring company. To the extent that these additional factors appear in
aggravated form, a finding of illegality is likely even though only a small
percentage of the total relevant market is controlled by the acquired com-
pany.
In reviewing horizontal acquisitions, the Government's concerns are:
(1) preventing elimination as an independent business entity of any com-
pany likely to have been a substantial competitive influence in the
market;
(2) preventing any company or small group of companies from obtaining
a position of dominance in the market;
(3) preventing significant increases in concentration in a market; and
(4) preserving significant possibilities for eventual deconcentration in a
concentrated market."
Vertical acquisitions are tested in much the same way. In a backward verti-
cal integration, when a company is acquiring a supplier, the critical question
is whether the acquisition will deprive the acquiring company's competitors
of a source of supply necessary to their effective competition with the ac-
quiring company. The percentage of the market for the items supplied con-
trolled by the acquired company is especially significant in testing the legality
of the acquisition. An even higher percentage can be defended, however, by
proof that adequate quantities of the items supplied are readily available to
the competitors of the acquiring company. In a forward vertical integration,
when a company acquires a customer, usually illegality is found if competi-
tors of the acquiring company have been deprived of a substantial customer
necessary to the maintenance of their effective competition. Again, the per-
centage of the market represented by the customer's purchases is the major
criterion of legality."
"Id. at 363.
"See, e.g., United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271 (1975); United
States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l. Bank, 422 U.S. 86 (1975); United States v. General Dynamics
Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
"See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972); Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
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The types of competitive injury that may result from a vertical acquisition
include foreclosing access to potential customers, foreclosing access to po-
tential suppliers, and facilitating promotional product differentiation. Thus,
the acquisition will be examined closely to determine whether it creates a
substantial potential for a supply or price squeeze, for a loss of customers of
the competitors of the acquired firms, or for impeding the entry of new sellers
or the expansion of existing sellers. A significant adverse effect in either the
supplying or purchasing firm's market will normally trigger a challenge of the
acquisition.
Pure conglomerate acquisitions have been attacked only recently by the
enforcement agencies. Therefore, the guidelines of illegality are only begin-
ning to emerge. The significant factor is the economic or marketing strength
of the acquiring company and the probable effect of that strength on the
market in which the acquired company operated. For example, if a financial
giant acquires a company in an industry composed of small competitors of
roughly equal size, a court might infer that competition in the acquired
company's market will be affected detrimentally because of that company's
heightened economic strength as a result of having a "rich parent." Small
competitors would fear to compete vigorously on such matters as price and
promotion, and potential competitors would be "scared off." Post-
acquisition economic data concerning the actual competitive effects of the
acquisition are frequently used in conglomerate acquisition cases."
The standards applied to market-extension acquisitions are similar to these
applied to pure conglomerate acquisitions. The likely effect of the imposition
of the acquiring company's economic strength on the competitive structure
of the geographic market in which the acquired company did business will
provide the test of legality. Potential competition, that is, the likelihood that
one of the companies would enter the other's market on its own, is another
factor. The trend toward concentration in the industry, however, is the factor
of paramount importance. To date, market-extension acquisitions have been
attacked mostly in those industries in which a wave of acquisitions has
changed a traditional pattern of local competition into one of national oligo-
poly. 7
3
Product-extension acquisitions are judged by tests of illegality similar to
the tests used to judge pure conglomerate and market extension acquisitions.
The economic strength of the acquiring company, the effects on competition
in the market of the acquired company, and barriers to entry are all signifi-
cant factors.7
4
"See, e.g., FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1962). United States v. DuPont
& Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957); United States v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 324 F. Supp. 19 (D. Conn.
1970).
"See, e.g., United States v. Marine Bancorp., Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974); United States v.
Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973).
"See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); Kennecot Copper Corp. v.
FTC, 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 909 (1974).
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G. Defenses
1. FAILING COMPANY
If an acquisition would otherwise violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act, it
may nevertheless be held valid if it can be shown that:
(1) the resources of the acquired company are "so depleted and the pros-
pect of rehabilitation so remote that it faced the grave possibility of
business failure";" and
(2) the acquiring company was the only available purchaser after the ac-
quired firm made bona fide efforts to seek alternative purchasers.7  As
to this second requirement, in 1977 the then Assistant Attorney
General in charge of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division
stated:
While there may be room for disagreement regarding the nature of the showing that
must be made to carry the burden of the second prong of the failing company
doctrine, all too often counsel simply ignore this requirement altogether, or assert
that on the date of consummation, no other purchaser had an interest, offering as
proof of the fact that no one sought to buy after the merger agreement in question
was publicly announced. This simply does not satisfy the requirement of clear and
convincing proof of a bona fide attempt to find a less anticompetitive purchaser."
2. DEPLETED RESOURCES
If the acquired company's resources are so depleted that its future is dim,
its acquisition may not be anticompetitive, because the company has ceased
to be a competitive factor in the market. Thus, in this special type of situa-
tion, even though the requirements of the failing company defense cannot be
met, the acquisition may be deemed to be not anticompetitive."8
3. COUNTERVAILING POWER
In dicta the Supreme Court has stated that in some cases an acquisition
might be upheld if it enables two small companies "to compete more effec-
tively with larger corporations dominating the relevant market." 79 However,
"International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
'
6Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 138 (1969); see United States v.
Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549(1971); Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.,
553 F.2d 964, 983 (5th Cir. 1977). For a recent analysis of this defense see testimony of Asst.
Attorney General John H. Shenefield on the Failing Company Defense before the Subcomm. on
Antitrust, Monopoly and Business Rights of the Senate Judiciary Comm. 96th Cong., I st Sess.
(July 19, 1979).
"Address by Donald 1. Baker, Government Litigation Under Section 7: The Old Merger
Guidelines and the New Antitrust Majority, 16-17, (Feb. 24, 1977). In a controversial June 1978
decision the Justice Department consented to the merger of LTV Corporation and Lykes Cor-
poration on the basis that Lykes was a "failing company." Dept of Justice Press Release (June
21, 1978), reprinted in 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,381. See 869 ANTITRUST I TRADE REC.
REP. (BNA) at A-21 (June 22, 1978). See also, Lancaster Colony Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 1 21,538 (1979).
"United States v. General Dynamics, 415 U.S. 486, 506-08 (1974).
"Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 319 (1962).
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it appears that this defense is inapplicable if the larger firm is in another
market or if the relevant market is already concentrated. 0
4. ECONoMIc BENEFITS
The possible economic or social benefits of an acquisition cannot be used
as a defense to an anticompetitive merger." However, special legislation per-
mits the courts to weigh the "convenience and needs of the community"
when evaluating bank mergers. 2
5. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN COMPULSION
If the acquisition was the result of compulsion by a foreign sovereign, the
victim of such compulsion may have a defense to a suit against him under
United States antitrust laws. No sovereign compulsion cases have yet arisen
in the context of an acquisition. However, the principles analyzed in the
relevant cases could be applicable to acquisitions.3
II. Enforcement
The United States Department of Justice may challenge acquisitions under
Sections 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act as well as under Section 7 of the Clayton
Act. The FTC may also challenge an acquisition under Section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act. In addition, the Commission is the exclusive enforcer of Section 5 of
the FTC Act.
It should be remembered that private parties may challenge acquisitions
under the Sherman and Clayton Acts. These private parties may seek injunc-
tive relief" and treble damages.'"
"United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370-71 (1963); Elco Corp. v. Micro-
dot, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 741, 751 (D. Del. 1973).
"United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 371.
"Bank Merger Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (c) (1976); United States v. Marine Bancorp Inc., 418
U.S. 602 (1974).
"Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
See also Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962); United
States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Information Center, Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. 1 70,600 (S.D.N.Y.
1962), order modified, 1965 Trade Cas. 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Linseman v. World Hockey
Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1324 (D. Conn. 1977). In the Justice Department's ANTITRUST GUIDE,
supra note 36, the Department takes the position that the foreign sovereign compulsion defense:
(1) does not apply to an act inside the United States; (2) does not apply unless the act is one of a
"truly sovereign entity acting within the scope of its powers under the law of its nationality;" (3)
does not apply to "commercial" acts of sovereigns; and (4) does not apply unless "the company
is being reasonable in doing what it felt it had to do." For a criticism of this position see Griffin,
A Critique oftthe Justice Department's Antitrust Guide for International Operations, I I COR-
NELL INT'L L. J. 215, 248-52 (1978).
"4Clayton Act §16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976).
"Clayton Act §4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). In order to recover treble damages for violating
Section 7 of the Clayton Act the plaintiff must prove an "antitrust" injury:
which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows
from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful. The injury should reflect the anticompeti-
tive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation. It
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A. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines
The Department of Justice has issued guidelines detailing the standards
applied by the Department in determining whether to challenge an acquisi-
tion.8" It is important to note that these statements are merely "guidelines"
and are not binding on the Justice Department or on the courts. As one court
has stated:
The purpose of the Guidelines is "to insure that the business community, the legal
profession and other interested persons are informed of the Department's policy of
enforcing Section 7 of the Clayton Act." However, they are in no way binding on
the Department in a particular case and the Department is entitled to evaluate each
case on the basis of its own facts and the varied factors that must be taken into
consideration. Indeed, the Department has available a business review procedure
which, as the Guidelines point out, "makes available statements of the
Department's present enforcement intentions with regard to particular proposed
mergers or acquisitions.""
B. FTC Industry Guidelines
The FTC has issued three formal statements of enforcement policy pertain-
ing to particular industries. The present validity of some of these statements
in this rapidly changing area of the law is questionable because of their age.8
C. Notification Requirements
1. HART-SCOTT-RODINO ACT
In most cases there is no requirement that advance notification of intended
acquisitions be given to the Department of Justice or to the FTC. However, in
1976 Congress added a new section to the Clayton Act requiring that parties
to certain large acquisitions report their plans to the FTC and to the Antitrust
Division and wait thirty to fifty days (with a shorter fifteen to twenty-five day
period allowed for cash tender offers) while the antitrust agencies evaluate
the data and, if they so desire, seek an injunction to stop consummation of
the acquisition. 9
should, in short, be "the type of loss that the claimed violations ... would be likely to cause."
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
"See note 45 supra.
"United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 297 F. Supp. 1061, 1073 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd
mem., 401 U.S. 986 (1971).
"Vertical mergers in thecement industry, I TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4520 (Released Jan. 17,
1967); Mergers in the food distribution industries, I TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4525 (Released
Jan. 17, 1967); Mergers in the dairy industry, I TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 14532 (Released July 3,
1973). The FTC has announced that firms covered by the dairy industry guidelines must file the
special form relating to dairy operations in addition to the Hart-Scott-Rodino premerger notifi-
cation form. 43 Fed. Reg. 28,046 (1978).
"The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No, 94-435, 90 Stat.
1383 (1976) (adding § 7A to the Clayton Act). For an analysis of this new statute, see Remarks of
Malcolm R. Pfunder, Asst. Director, FTC Bureau of Competition, Premerger Notification
After One Year (Aug. 14, 1979); Kintner, Griffin & Goldstein, The Hart-Scott-Rodino Anti-
trust Improvements Act: An Analysis, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1977).
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The amendment expressly provides that the enforcement agencies' failure
to challenge an acquisition during the waiting period does not stop them from
subsequently challenging the acquisition. 0
This new provision does not change the substantive standards for deter-
mining the legality of an acquisition, nor does it alter the Government's
burden of proof for obtaining a preliminary injunction delaying consumma-
tion of an acquisition. The section applies to any acquisition consummated
after September 4, 1978."'
2. PRIOR JUDGMENTS OR CONSENT DECREES
A ban or restriction on future acquisitions is a common form of ancillary
relief in antitrust cases. Therefore, it is essential that any judgments or con-
sent decrees entered into by either party to the transaction be examined to
determine whether the party is required to notify or to obtain the permission
of a court, the FTC, or the Justice Department before consummation of an
acquisition.92 If there is such a provision, the terms of the judgment will
dictate the proceduret to be followed.
D. Advance Clearance Procedures
Both the Justice Department and the FTC have procedures for obtaining
advance clearance for contemplated business activities.
1. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE BUSINESS REVIEW PROCEDURE
In response to a written request accompanied by all relevant data the Anti-
trust Division may
(1) state its present enforcement intentions with respect to the proposed
business conduct,
(2) decline to pass on the request, or
(3) take such action as it considers appropriate.9 3 The Department reserves
the right to bring an action even after issuing a favorable business
review letter.9
Thirty days after the Business Review Letter is issued, the letter requesting
the Review, the information supplied to support it, and the Division's letter
in response are indexed and placed in a file available to the public upon
request. The party requesting a Business Review Letter may request nondis-
"Clayton Act § 7A(i)(1).
"The implementing rules are at 16 C.F.R. §§ 801-803 (1979). Additional sources of informa-
tion are the Statement of Basis and Purpose for the rules, 43 Fed. Reg. 33,450(1978) and the FTC
PREMERGER NOTIFICATION COMPLIANCE GUIDE. The latter publication is available from the FTC
by writing to: Public Reference Branch, Room 130, FTC, Washington, D.C. 20580. See also 44
Fed. Reg. 47099-100 (Aug. 10, 1979) (Proposed change in rules re minimum dollar value exemp-
tions).
"See, e.g., United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223 (1975); United States v.
Swift & Co., 1969 Trade Cas. 1 72,701 (N.D. III. 1969).
"The procedure may be found in 28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (1979).
"See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 30 F.R.D. 358, 363 (D.R.I. 1962).
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closure of the information and such a request will be honored if certain crite-
ria in the regulation justifying nondisclosure are met."
2. FTC ADVISORY OPINIONS
The FTC has a procedure for obtaining nonbinding advisory opinions"6
which is generally similar to the above described procedure of the Justice
Department. Requests for advice and supporting material will be placed in
the public record unless a confidentiality request is filed and the FTC agrees
to honor it."
3. LIMITED CONCLUSIVENESS OF SINGLE-AGENCY FINDINGS
It should be remembered that a clearance by one agency does not prevent
the other agency from challenging the acquisition. For example, in 1970 Nes-
tle received informal advice from the Justice Department that it would not
challenge Nestle's purchase of a controlling interest in Libby, McNeil and
Libby. Nevertheless, in November 1972 the FTC announced that it would
conduct an investigation of the acquisition. More than two years later the
FTC closed its investigation on the ground that the acquisition was a permis-
sible "toehold" acquisition." However, after Nestle acquired Stouffer Cor-
poration the FTC did issue a complaint. 99
It also should be remembered that enforcement agencies usually take a very
conservative approach when they are requested to render an opinion that will
be made public. Moreover, information supplied to the enforcement agencies
during the course of an attempt to obtain advance clearance may be used later
against the supplier of the information by the agencies if the agencies refuse
to clear a transaction and that transaction is later consummated.
The FTC's explanatory comments relating to the implementing rules for
the premerger notification amendment make it clear that the grant or pen-
dency of a Business Review Letter or Advisory Opinion does not alter the
obligations imposed by the premerger amendment.' 0
III. Leading Relevant Cases
Set forth below, in chronological order, are brief descriptions of three
important reported cases involving acquisitions by aliens of American com-
panies. Cases involving similar acquisitions that were settled by consent de-
"Comegys, Business Reviews by the Antitrust Division, CONFERENCE BOARD RECORD,
March, 1974, at 22.
"See, e.g., Golden Grain Macaroni Co., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.(CCH) 1 19,521, at 21,587 (1971) (suit filed after favorable advisory opinion issued).
"16 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-1.4 (1979).
"See Wall St. J., June 14, 1974, at 1, col. 6.
"Nestle Alimentana, S.A. [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,808(1975). Note that both Libby and Stouffer were involved in the production of frozen foods.
0043 Fed. Reg. 33,505 (1978).
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crees' °' and those involving acquisitions of American companies by the
American subsidiaries of foreign firms may also be of interest.' 2
A. Copperweld/Imetal
Imetal, a large French holding company in the mining and mineral process-
ing industries, made a cash tender offer for the stock of Copperweld, Incor-
porated, an American corporation.'10 Copperweld manufactures specialty
metal products including alloy steel, tubing and bimetallic products. It
sought an injunction preventing consummation of the acquisition on several
grounds, including alleged violations of United States antitrust law.
Copperweld alleged that it was a customer of Imetal for certain raw mate-
rials and that its acquisition by Imetal would capture it as a customer and
would foreclose its purchase of other supplies from other companies. The
court rejected this contention because there was no evidence that Imetal in-
tended to force Copperweld to purchase supplies from it or its affiliates.
Moreover, because Copperweld's shares of the relevent supply markets were
comparatively small, any foreclosure would be de minimis. The court also
stated that there was insufficient evidence to support Copperweld's assertion
that Imetal was a "most likely potential entrant" into the relevant market.
The court denied Copperweld's motion for a preliminary injunction.'""
"'See United States v. Alcan Aluminium Ltd., 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 45,064 (D.N.J.
1964), 1965 Trade Cas. 1 71,366 (D.N.J. 1965) (refusal to grant temporary injunction); 1966
Trade Cas. 1 71,895 (D.N.J. 1966) (consent decree); 1968 Trade Cas. 1 72,631 (D.N.J. 1968)
(modified consent decree); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
45,069 (N.D. Ohio 1969), 1970 Trade Cas. 1 72,988 (N.D. Ohio 1970) (consent decree); United
States v. CIBA Corp., 4TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,070 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), 1970 Trade Cas. J1
73,269, at 73,319 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (consent decrees); In re Imperial Chemical Indus., Ltd.,
[1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 19,914, 19,965, 20,444 (1972); Holder-
bank Financiere Glaris, S.A., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
20,000 (1972). [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 120,229 (1973) (consent
decree); United States v. International Nickel Co. of Canada, 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
45,076 (E.D. Pa. 1976), 1978-1 Trade Cas. J 61,869 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (consent decree); In re
Nestle Alimentana S.A., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 20,808 (1975)
(complaint) 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) J 21,560 (consent decree); United States v. British Col-
umbia Forest Prods., Ltd., 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 45,078 (D. Minn. 1978) (complaint).
"'See e.g., In re Rhinechem Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 21,535 (1978) (Rinechem is a
wholly owned subsidiary of Bayer, A.G.) (proposed acquisition abandoned after complaint filed
by the FTC); In re BIC Pen Corp., 3 TRADE REQ. REP. (CCH) 1121,267, 21,273 (FTC (1977)
(BIC Corp. is a subsidiary of BIC, S.A.) (proposed acquisition abandoned after complaint filed
by the FTC); Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 553 F.2d 964 (5th Cir. 1977) (ac-
quisitions by Volkswagen's American subsidiary); United States v. Alcan Aluminium Ltd., 4
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 145,077 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (Alcan Corp. is a wholly owned subsidiary of
Alcan Ltd.) (proposed acquisition abandoned after complaint filed by Justice Department);
United States v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 4 TRADE REQ. REP. (CCH) 1 45,070 (D. Mass. 1970),
1971 Trade Cas. 1 73,689 (D. Mass. 1971) (consent decree) (Asiatic Petroleum is a subsidiary of
Royal Dutch/Shell).
"'Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal, 403 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
"'For a similar case see Texasgulf Inc. v. Canadian Dev. Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Tex.
1973).
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B. BOC/Airco
In May 1977, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit" 5 set aside a
1975 FTC decision'0 6 declaring the acquisition of Airco, Incorporated, an
American company, by BOC International, Limited. (BOC), a British com-
pany, to be violative of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The British Government
filed a brief with the court as amicus curiae urging that the FTC's order be set
aside. In addition, the Commission of the European Communities filed an
aide memoire with the court opposing the FTC's decision.
BOC is the world's second largest producer of industrial gases. It had never
produced or sold industrial gases in the United States. Airco was the third
largest producer of industrial gases in the United States with about sixteen
percent of the market. The top two producers in the United States had market
shares of twenty-six percent and eighteen percent. In December 1973 BOC
acquired, via a tender offer, a controlling interest (thirty-five percent) in
Airco.
The FTC had based its decision on the "actual potential entrant" branch
of the potential competition theory. According to the FTC, the acquisition of
a large firm in an oligopolistic market may substantially lessen competition,
if, but for the acquisition, the acquiring firm at some future time would
probably have entered the market de novo or via a "toehold" acquisition.
The Court of Appeals noted that this "actual potential entrant" theory
"lies on the frontiers of antitrust law."' 7 However, the court did not reach
the issue of the theory's basic validity because the record failed to establish a
fundamental precondition to application of the theory. The FTC did not seek
a review of this decision by the United States Supreme Court.
C. SKF/Tyson
AB-SKF, a Swedish corporation and the world's largest producer of
bearings, acquired several foreign bearings companies which were alleged to
be actual or potential suppliers of ball bearings in the United States. SKF
Industries, Incorporated, the American subsidiary of the Swedish firm and
the third ranking producer in the United States, acquired two major United
States bearings manufacturers, Tyson and Nice. SKF also entered into an
agreement with Federal-Mogul Corporation (F-M), the fourth ranking pro-
ducer in the United States, under the terms of which SKF sold bearings to
F-M which then sold to SKF's former customers.
The FTC issued a complaint alleging that the various acquisitions and
agreements by AB-SKF and its American subsidiary constituted an unfair
method of competition in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act and would
'BOC Int'l Ltd. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977).
06[1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,063 (1975).
'BOC Int'l Ltd. v. F.T.C., 557 F.2d at 25.
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substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in the manufac-
ture of ball bearings throughout the United States in violation of Section 7 of
the Clayton Act.' 8
In May 1978, the administrative law judge issued an initial decision holding
that SKF and Federal-Mogul had conspired to allocate ball bearing markets.
He also held that two of the challenged acquisitions had been cleared by the
FTC before their consummation and there was no evidence that the FTC's
decisions had been erroneous. As to other foreign acquisitions by AB-SKF,
the judge held that the FTC lacked legislative jurisdiction because there was
no proof that those acquisitions had anticompetitive effects in the United
States.
There is no evidence that any of the companies acquired by AB-SKF were perceived
as potential entrants into the United States by anyone, or that their prior existence
(independent of AB-SKF) affected the American bearings market, or that their
acquisition insulated or entrenched the competitive position of SKF or F-M in any
United States bearing market in any way whatsoever .... 101
On appeal the Commission affirmed the initial decision of the ALJ."0
With respect to the staff's challenge of AB-SKF's foreign acquisitions on the
ground that there were part of an overall scheme to insulate SKF from foreign
competition, the Commission stated:
[Tihe theory of the complaint, while imaginative, might be more convincing had
SKF, which allegedly was to be insulated from foreign competition, held a more
dominant position in the U.S. market. The prospect of a foreign parent systemati-
cally acquiring foreign potential entrants in order to protect its subsidiary's monop-
oly profits in the U.S. market is rational only if that subsidiary has substantial
domestic market power....
More importantly, no satisfactory competitive nexus has been shown by complaint
counsel between the AB-SKF acquisitions and either the Tyson or Nice acquisitions.
The record simply fails to reveal any linkage or special market factors connecting
these widely scattered events from which a reasonable inference of anticompetitive
purpose or effect could be drawn. Each of the acquisitions, when analyzed sepa-
rately, exhibits few characteristics suggesting any significant competitive impact in
the U.S. market."'
Conclusion
A review of the leading cases involving acquisitions by aliens in the United
States reveals that there is no discrimination in the enforcement of United
States antitrust law against such acquisitions. Thus, the conclusion of the
Commerce Department's 1976 study of foreign investment that "there is no
evidence that the antitrust laws have had a restraining effect on foreign direct
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investment in the United States" " may be correct. However, it is also ap-
propriate to note that there is no special consideration given to the problems
inherent in international acquisitions. The flexibility of an "international
rule of reason" offers hope that in the future all factors relevant to a realistic
evaluation of these acquisitions will be considered, both by courts and by
enforcement agencies.
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